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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
RANDALL BRYANT, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
-vs- Case No. 
JOHN TURNER, Warden of the Utah State 10757 
Prison, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
Appellant, Randall Bryant, appeals from a judg-
ment of the District Court of the Third Judicial Dis-
trict denying relief sought under original Habeas 
Corpus proceedings. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On February 21, 1964, Randall Bryant plead 
guilty to the crime of murder in the second degree 
(Exhibit D-23). Bryant was oiiginaly charged with 
murder in the first degree arising out of the death of 
his wife from gunshot wounds. He was sentenced 
by Judge C. Nelson Day, Fifth Judicial District, to an 
indeterminate term of ten years to life in the Utah 
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State Prison. Commitment issued March 10, 1964. 
Bryant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in 
the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District about 
February 8th, 1966 (Exhibit D-7). The petition was 
denied and dismissed (Exhibit D-11). On June 28, 
1966, Bryant again filed a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus (R-7). A hearing was held on this petition on 
September 1st and September 23rd, 1966 before 
Third District Judge Leonard W. Elton. A judgment 
was entered October 21, 1966, dismissing and deny-
ing this petition (R-64). From this judgment appellant 
seeks a reversal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent submits that the judgment 
should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Respondent basically agrees with the facts 
pertinent to the issues on appeal. Respondent how-
ever points out some additional facts omitted by ap-
pellant. 
On page 3 of appellant's brief reference is made 
to a letter sent from Dr. Roger Kiger, Senior Psychia-
trist at the Utah State Hospital, to Judge C. Nelson 
Day. This letter, dated October 21, 1963, stated in 
part: 
It is the opinion of our clinical staff that [appellan~] 
is psychotic or "insane" as a result of the organic 
brain damage he suffered to the cerebral vascular 
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hemorrhage he experienced some fourteen months 
ago. 
The above statement was greatly modW3d, if 
not wholly repudiated by Dr. Kiger during his testi-
mony at hearing in the instant case where he agreed 
the opinion expressed in the letter was "too hasty", 
and not supported by further examinations. (R. 229). 
Note also Exhibit D-14, a letter from Dr. Kiger to ap-
pellant's attorney, where Dr. Kiger characterizes the 
letter as having been written somewhat premature-
ly. 
Respondent also points out a statement on page 
22 of appellant's brief (contained in his statement 
of facts), where appellant argues that the transcript 
of the proceedings at the mental hearings are the 
best evidence of the factors weighed by Judge C. 
Nelson Day in reaching his decision. Respondent 
does not agree with appellant's placement of the 
statement in the brief or the statement itself. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED AP~ 
PELLANT'S PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS. 
This being an appeal from an order of the Third 
District Court denying relief sought under habeas 
corpus, the scope of the inquiry on appeal is limited 
to the discovery of substantial evidence in the rec-
ord upon which the trial court could have based its 
ruling. {Ward v. Turner, 12 Utah 2d 210, 366 Pac 2d 
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72, Cert. denied 371 U.S. 872 (1961); Gallegos v. Tur-
ner 17 Utah 2d 386 (1965); Scott v. Beckstead 13 Utah 
2d 428, 375 Pac 2d 767 (1962).) The verified complaint 
and amended petition for a writ of Habeas Corpus 
(R-5) alleges a deficiency in the proceedings held 
in the Fifth Judicial District to determine the mental 
capacities of the appellant. Appellant in his petition 
urges that no finding was made as to whether ap-
pellant could aid in his own defense and that no in-
quiry was made into the matter (R-6). 
First of all, respondent points out that the com-
plaint for a sanity inquiry filed by the District At-
torney of the Fifth Judicial District alleged that an in-
quiry was necessary into the sanity of the appel-
lant because of appellant's "inability to talk or to 
answer questions relative to said [murder J 
charges" (Exhibit D-23). It appears therefore, that 
at the very outset of the proceedings in District 
Court appellant's communicative problems were 
recognized. 
Likewise, at the first hearing to determine the 
mental condition of the appellant, transcribed as ex-
hibit D-3, Dr. Kiger, a psychiatrist, was specifically 
questioned as to appellant's ability to aid in his own 
defense (D-3, page 9, line 22). Dr. Kiger had previous-
ly testified that appellant was not legally insane. It 
is also beyond question that the court was aware 
of the problem of communicating with appellant 
(D-3, page 12). At this same hearing Dr. James R. 
Whitten was questioned at great length as to appel-
lant's ability to narrate the details of the alleged 
shooting (D-3, page 23, commencing at line 11). Dr. 
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Whitten had no opinion as to appellant's ability to 
discern right from wrong (D-3, page 24). Dr. Whitten 
finally was asked directly 1Arhether appellant's im-
paired ability to communicate might prohibit him 
from aiding in his defense. This dialogue appears as 
follows: 
Mr. Fenton: and would it correct to say if there were 
some items that might be to his benefit in his de-
fense, that if we fail to guess and question him in 
such a manner as to get some idea what he had in 
mind, that we might easily miss something that 
might be important to his defense? 
Dr. Whitten: That's correct. 
(Exhibit D-3, page 28, line 2). 
During a continuation of the hearing previously 
referred to, Dr. Alpine McGregor and Dr. McLaren 
Ruesh testified as to their examination of appellan~ 
and the difficulty or facility with which one might 
communicate with appellant. (Exhibit D-2, page 11; 
page 17). Doctor Ruesh is specifically asked about 
appellant's ability to communicate a bona fide de-
fense to counsel. (Exhibit D-2, page 24, line 15). 1t 
z1ppears forcefully and clearly in the transcripts of 
these hearings (D-2, D-3) that the question of appel-
lant's ability to aid in his defense was constantly 
before the court during these extensive hearings. 
To conclude otherwise is to disregard clear proof. 
Judge C. Nelson Day, of the Fifth Judicial Dis-
trict, was called to testify in the instant case and 
testified as to the foctors he considered in issuing 
the order finding appellant sane and able to stand 
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trial (TR. 286). Judge Day, when asked to explain 
the meaning of his statement that appellant "is and 
was at the time of the commission of this crime suf-
ficiently and mentally aware and capable to warrant 
the submission of the matter to a jury." (D-2, page 25), 
stated: 
"What I intended by that statement to which you 
have referred and which I just read was to mean that 
Mr. Bryant was within the meaning of the law men-
tally capable of participating in his own defense, as-
sisting in that regard that he was within the mean-
ing of the law not psychotic or insane either at the 
time of the commission of the offense or thereafter, 
particularly at that time." (TR. 186). 
Based upon the testimony and the other evi-
dence before the Court, Judge Leonard Elton, of the 
Third Judicial District issued a conclusion of law 
stating petitioner had been found after hearing to 
be legally sane, and further, was found to be able 
to communicate with his counsel and aid in his own 
defense. (R-62, 63). To have done otherwise would 
have been clearly unreasonable. 
Respondent has no argument with the authori-
ties cited by appellant to the effect that a determina-
tion should be made as to the accused's capacity 
to comprehend his position, to understand the na· 
ture and object of the proceedings against him and 
to conduct his defense in a rational manner, and to 
cooperate with his counsel to the end that any avail-
able defense may be interposed. We further agree 
that this determination is distinct from a determina-
tion of sanity as it relates to criminal responsibility. 
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We only point out that the record abounds with evi-
dence that the distinct issue of mental ability to 
stand trial was before the court, in the Fifth Judicial 
District, from the outset of the proceedings against 
accused and that a determination was made in this 
connection even by the standards and definitions 
appellant now urges on this court. 
It was appellant's burden in the instant case to 
bear the burden of showing with clear and convinc-
ing proof that he had been denied due process of 
law by the actions of the court. This he has not done, 
and the trial court in the instant case correctly re-
fused to grant the relief prayed for under the peti-
tion. (R. 62, 63, 64) (Scott v. Beckstead, supra.) 
Appellant argues that the court improperly con-
sidered the testimony of Judge Day during the hear-
ing in the instant case, wherein the Judge explained 
the factors he considered in making the disputed 
finding. Appellant has not given this court the bene-
fit of his reasoning or research as to why Judge Day 
should not be permitted to elaborate on his order 
or why certain selected documents (D-2, page 25; 
TR. 186; and D-23 MINUTE ENTRY dated December 
10, 1963) should constitute the sole evidence of the 
basis of Judge Day's ruling. (Brief of appellant, page 
22). Apparently appellant is only displeased with 
the content not the admissibility of such testimony. 
Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966), cited by 
appellant on page 33 of his brief, has no application 
to the instant case. In the Pate case the trial court 
refused to allow a continuance of several hours dur-
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ing triai to obtain expert psychiatric testimony as to 
the defendant's present insanity. This was after ex-
tensive testimony had been received during the 
trial concerning the defendant's prior history of irra-
tional behavior. The United States Supreme Court 
agreed with the Circuit Court of Appeals that de-
fendant was not given a fair opportunity to develop 
facts on the issue of competency as required by 
due process of the law. In the instant case, two ex-
haustive hearings were held on appellant's compe-
tency to stand trial; therefore, the problem of the 
waiver of such required hearing is not before this 
court as it was in the Pate case, nor does respc:: :lent 
urge such a position in the instant case. The issue 
of competency to stand trial was properly raised 
and thoroughly adjudicated prior to the entry of ap-
pellant's guilty plea to a lesser charge. We submit 
there was nothing for appellant to waive by his plea 
simply because he had received all to which he was 
entitled in the determinations at the mental hear-
ings. 
CONCLUSION 
The record clearly indicates a concern for the 
rights of the appellant and a recognition of his ad-
mitted physical limitations. The sanity hearings 
demonstrate a thoughtful, patient and judicious con-
sideration of all aspects of the appellant's compe-
tency to stand trial by the Fifth District Court. The 
trial court in considering the issues raised by appel-
lant in the instant case properly found a sufficient 
evidentiary basis to sustain the Fifth District Court's 
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order holding the appellant for trial. This court 
should affirm the trial court's findings and order 
and afford finality to the obviously just determina-
tion of competency. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
GERALD G. GUNDRY 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
